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A significant portion of the growth in American immigration to Canada from the mid-
1960s to the mid-1970s was a consequence of the Vietnam War. For the Canadian
government, the appearance of large numbers of draft resisters at the border was a
boon. Draft resisters, if not deserters, tended to be young, middle-class, and educated
— the very type of immigrant the government wanted. Allowing entry to draft resisters
also reaped an important symbolic benefit in that it allowed the Canadian govern-
ment to demonstrate its independence from the United States and its opposition to the
war. In practice, however, not all young Americans resisting militarism were wel-
comed. Government officials argued contradictory interpretations of the policy on
admitting draft resisters and deserters and their legal status in Canada. The Cold War
and the increased domestic concerns generated by student and protest movements in
the 1960s also solidified cooperation between the American and Canadian security
states in maintaining a surveillance of draft resisters and deserters.
La guerre du Vietnam explique en bonne partie l’augmentation du nombre d’immi-
grants américains franchissant la frontière canadienne du milieu des années 1960
jusqu’au milieu de la décennie suivante. Le gouvernement canadien s’est alors
réjoui de voir apparaître à ses portes de si nombreux dissidents. C’est que les
réfractaires à la conscription (s’agissant parfois même de déserteurs) étaient
généralement jeunes, de classe moyenne et instruits. Pour le gouvernement cana-
dien, il s’agissait là de l’immigrant idéal. Accueillir les réfractaires à la conscrip-
tion lui a aussi procuré un bienfait symbolique de taille, celui de marquer son
indépendance par rapport aux États-Unis et son opposition à la guerre. Mais dans
les faits, les jeunes Américains résistant au militarisme n’étaient pas tous les bien-
venus. Les fonctionnaires faisaient valoir des interprétations contradictoires de la
politique d’admission au Canada des réfractaires à l’appel sous les drapeaux et des
déserteurs et de leur statut juridique. Ajoutons à cela que la guerre froide et la mul-
tiplication des préoccupations intérieures suscitées par les mouvements étudiants et
de protestation des années 1960 amenaient également les États américain et cana-
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dien à collaborer plus étroitement sur le plan de la sécurité pour surveiller les
réfractaires et les déserteurs.
IN HIS MOVING memoir Travels by Night, writer Douglas Featherling bit-
terly recalls his reasons for leaving the United States during the late 1960s.
Reflecting on life in America, he writes, I found it a constant struggle to
keep out the terror and let the stimulation enter. It proved impossible, in fact.
Some days the history would rise in the gorge like vomit, then go down
slowly with my thoughts of escape. For Featherling the only realistic
method of coping, of dealing with these intense feelings of revolt welling up,
was to leave, to remove oneself from the United States, to seek out a new
country, to come to Canada. According to Featherling, one literally had to
resign from being an American. He writes, [M]y only ambition was to be a
last-generation American and a first-generation Canadian.1 Staying in the
United States was for him untenable, a painful personal experience as much
as it was a toxic political environment. More than just a pragmatic or instru-
mental decision, coming to Canada was the way he intended to be real, to
be authentic, and to stay true to the ethical concepts generated by the pro-
found cultural critique of the 1960s.
Featherling was just one of thousands of young men and women, as well as
older Americans, who made their way across the U.S./Canada border during
the late 1960s and early 1970s. For the Canadian government, the appearance
of large numbers of draft resisters at the border was a boon. Indeed, draft
resisters were the very type of immigrant  young, middle-class, and edu-
cated  that the government wanted. Allowing draft resisters entry also
reaped an important symbolic benefit  it allowed the Canadian government
to demonstrate its independence from the United States and its opposition to
the war in Vietnam. This independence had its limits, however. The Royal
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) collected information on resisters and
routinely shared it with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the
United States. Nor were all young Americans resisting militarism welcomed
with open arms by the Canadian government. Deserters, many of whom were
working-class, had little or no post-secondary education, and in some cases
were African American, did not generally experience a warm welcome. In
many cases their status was in doubt, and on numerous occasions border offi-
cials actively sought to deny deserters entry.
A growing literature re-examines the history of draft resisters and Ameri-
can expatriates in Canada during the Vietnam Era.2 In recent years a number
1 Douglas Featherling, Travels By Night: A Memoir of the Sixties (Toronto: McArthur & Company,
1994), p. 102.
2 This article is drawn from a larger historical study of American expatriates and draft resisters and their
involvement in new social movements in Toronto during the late 1960s and early 1970s. See David S.
Churchill, When Home Became Away: American Expatriates and New Social Movements in Toronto,
19651977 (PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 2001).
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of scholarly accounts, journalistic profiles, biographical sketches, and mem-
oirs have brought attention to the experiences of the thousands of Americans
who migrated north during the late 1960s and early 1970s.3 Indeed, the liter-
ature on draft resisters has undergone its own evolution, from early texts that
provided sympathetic portraits of resisters and highlighted the individual
choices and sacrifices posed by life in Canada, to a sociological literature that
explores the experiential and subjective effects of exile and migration and the
process of assimilation and adaptation. Most notably, sociologist and legal
scholar John Hagan has approached the question of entry from a public pol-
icy and legal perspective, arguing that the Canadian government sought
covertly to restrain the entry of draft resisters into Canada while publicly
declaring that they were welcome. Not until the issue of restricted access
became framed within the discourse of Canadian sovereignty was the Liberal
government forced to allow open immigration for all draft resisters. Hagans
narrative is accurate in that the Canadian governments administration of the
border was framed within a context of debates around Canadian sovereignty.
Yet his notion of a gap between the pronouncements of the Canadian govern-
ment and actual practice at the border blurs the contradictory impulses within
the Canadian government and civil service during the late 1960s. Indeed, the
question of resisters and military deserters was not merely a matter of prac-
tice contradicting publicly articulated policy. Rather, it reflected a much
broader set of contradictory motivations and differences within the govern-
ment, in the federal bureaucracy, and in the complicated Cold War relation-
ship between Canada and the United States.
The U.S. military presence in Vietnam was a direct result of an interven-
tionist foreign policy willing to engage in armed conflict to thwart the spread
of international communism. This logic of intervention, stabilization, and
containment  shaped and practised by the successes of World War II 
drove the U.S. government into a deeper and deeper commitment in South-
east Asia. Such a policy also brought the United States into growing conflict
at home, especially with the large, middle-class student population who had
become increasingly politicized and willing to question the military ambi-
tions and objectives of the White House and the Pentagon.
Between 1966 and 1976, more than 250,000 Americans immigrated to
Canada, double the rate of U.S. immigration during the previous decade.
Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, the annual number of U.S. resi-
dents who migrated north consistently hovered around 11,500. In 1965 this
3 The most significant of the recent scholarship on draft resisters is that of sociologist John Hagan, who
has explored their motivations and experiences. See John Hagan, Northern Passage: American Viet-
nam War Resisters in Canada (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001). Also see Frank
Kusch, All American Boys: Draft Dodgers in Canada from the Vietnam War (Westport, Conn.: Praeger,
2002). For more journalistic accounts and profiles of resisters and expatriates, see James Dickerson,
North to Canada: Men and Women Against the Vietnam War (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999); Allan
Haig-Brown, Hell No We Won’t Go! (Vancouver: Raincoast Books, 1996).
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figure began to climb dramatically, reaching a height of 26,541 in 1974 and
then declining quickly to 17,315 in 1976. Thus between 1965 and 1976 there
was a net increase of roughly 120,000 American immigrants to Canada.4 The
actual number of draft resisters and deserters is uncertain. Estimates vary
between 30,000 and 100,000, but Renée Kasinskys figure of 40,000 seems
closest to an accurate accounting.5 Kasinsky arrived at this sum by utilizing
Canadian immigration statistics, tracing the number of draft-aged American
males who entered Canada as Landed Immigrants between 1965 and 1975.
This figure, however, does not represent the total number of Americans who
came to Canada because of the Vietnam War. Thousands of young women
and older Americans came to Canada because they felt they could no longer
tolerate the political climate in the United States. Some of these migrants
were the girlfriends or spouses of draft resisters, while others were parents
who moved their entire families because they wanted to protect draft-aged
sons. For a few, mainly academics and professionals, the opportunity to work
in Canada coincided with the desire to leave the corrosive political environ-
ment in the United States. Considering these factors, it is reasonable to
assume that a significant portion of the growth in American migration
between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s was a consequence of the Vietnam
War, stemming either directly from the flight of draft resisters or indirectly
from the migration of lovers, families, and the politically disenchanted.
For many Americans, crossing the Canadian boarder was a relatively sim-
ple and uncomplicated journey. Though the choice of going north may have
been difficult and filled with cultural significance, the actual entry into Can-
ada was often negotiated with ease. In some cases it was only a matter of
loading up the car, driving to the border, and declaring the desire to immi-
grate. This movement was a counterbalance to the historical southern flow of
Canadians in search of education, opportunity, and higher wages. In the main,
the Canadian government was happy to reverse the so-called brain drain
and have young, educated Americans settling in Canada. Draft resisters
4 F. C. Leacy, ed., Series 385416. Immigration to Canada by Country of Permanent Residence, 1956
1976, Historical Statistics of Canada (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1983).
5 Lawrence Baskir and William Strauss estimate that 50,000 resisters took flight from the United
States. Of these, they estimate that 30,000 made their way to Canada. David Surrey estimates that the
actual number is between 60,000 and 100,000. Baskir and Strauss estimate that 15 million American
men avoided military service during the Vietnam era. They did so through a variety of techniques and
technicalities ranging from health reasons, hardship, family dependency, high draft numbers, marriage,
failure to meet the psychological or physical requirements, bureaucratic error, destruction of files, con-
scientious objection, and flight abroad. Still another million men avoided service in Vietnam by joining
the National Guard. Only a small fraction of the men who avoided military service during this period
decided that their only option was to come to Canada. Lawrence M. Baskir and William A. Strauss,
Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War and the Vietnam Generation (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1978), pp. 2735, 4952; Renée G. Kasinsky, Refugees from Militarism: Draft-Age Americans
in Canada (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1976), pp. 7781; David Surrey, Choice of Con-
science (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 6786.
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helped to supplement the loss in human capital that Canada experienced
yearly as many of its scientists, engineers, educators, and entertainers went
south to live and work. Young, healthy, and predominately middle-class 
and usually with at least some post-secondary education  U.S. draft resist-
ers were precisely the sort of immigrants Canada wished to attract. Moreover,
the common language, shared popular culture, and familiarity with North
American industry and commerce made draft resisters easily employable.
Assimilation into the everyday life of Canada was thus fairly easy, with only
the minimal amount of transition. In addition, changes to the very process of
immigration, namely the establishment of an immigration point system in
1967, proved advantageous to American expatriates.
The key to securing legal and permanent entry to Canada was acquiring
Landed Immigrant status. Becoming Landed had a number of significant
benefits. It allowed an individual to live and work in Canada indefinitely,
without fear of being deported. It extended to the individual all the rights of
Canadian citizenship with the exception of the franchise. The 1967 Immigra-
tion Act moved Canada away from a national origin model of immigration to
one that valued skills and the potential to assimilate into Canadian society.
To make this new determination, a point system was instituted to screen
potential immigrants at the port of entry. An individual wanting to enter the
country as a Landed Immigrant only needed to declare his or her intention at
the border crossing to initiate the immigration proceedings. Immigration
officials would then conduct interviews, assessing points in various catego-
ries. One discretionary category termed Personal Quality allowed an indi-
vidual officer to add a personal, subjective assessment to the point total.
Rick Bébout recalls counting up his possible points the night before his
immigration to Canada and realizing that he would fall just short of the
magic total. This meant that he would have to get at least some discretionary
points from the immigration officer at the border. Luckily for Bébout, his
interview went well, and the officer awarded him the points needed for
Landed Immigrant status.6  On paper, the point system provided for open
immigration, but in practice it was strongly biased toward the educated mid-
dle-class and skilled labour from industrialized nations. Moreover, the point
system reflected a shift in the governments conceptualization of who was an
ideal immigrant.7
To qualify for Landed status an applicant needed only 50 out of a possible
100 points. For young, college-educated Americans, the point system was a
boon. English-speaking, with high skill levels and a desire to move to com-
munities such as Toronto with high demand for labour, most draft resisters had
no trouble earning enough points. Moreover, the Canadian government was
delighted to have immigrants who so clearly matched the ideal profile of indi-
6 Rick Bébout, interview by the author, Toronto, September 2, 1998.
7 On the point system and American expatriates, see Kasinsky, Refugees From Militarism, pp. 6669;
Surrey, Choice of Conscience, pp. 108113.
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viduals who, in the words of the governments White Paper on Immigration,
were ready to become part of a highly complex industrial and urbanized soci-
ety.8 Despite the fact that these ideal immigrants were coming to Canada
to avoid military service, the government was keen to have such valuable
human resources.
The negotiation, transgression, and policing of the border exposed the mul-
tiple motivations of the Canadian state during the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Immigration into the country was part of the Canadian governments larger
project of state modernization and development, a way of bringing in skilled
labour and knowledgeable workers to augment the existing population. At the
same time, the border was the critical line of containment, a jurisdictional
boundary to keep out threats to the countrys security, to protect the Canadian
nation from threats of communism, social deviancy, and other prospective
enemies. Within the Cold War paradigm, the immigration of Americans pre-
sented a double-edged sword: on one side were the increased human resource
needs of post-war prosperity and growth; on the other were the possible
threats to that prosperity posed by the potential entry of young radicals and
subversives. The Canadian governments approach to this predicament fol-
lowed both impulses  it would allow in the young Americans fleeing mili-
tary service, and it would attempt to regulate their entry and monitor their
actions.
The most important document for these resisters was The Manual for Draft
Aged Immigrants to Canada. Put out by the small independent publisher
House of Anansi Press, The Manual provided a thorough guide on how to
become a Landed Immigrant in Canada.9 Beginning as a pamphlet and swell-
ing in size with each new edition, The Manual became an overnight success
and proved to be a financial windfall for both the House of Anansi Press and
the Toronto Anti-Draft Program. The first edition in early 1968 had a print
run of 5,000, which quickly sold out. A second edition published in March
1968 had a print run of 20,000. By 1970 there were more than 65,000 copies
of The Manual in print, and the book was in its fifth edition.10 Its precursor,
the first guide to draft-aged immigrants, was a document produced by the
Canadian student organization Student Union for Peace Action (SUPA), enti-
tled Escape to Freedom.11 The principal author of this early immigration
8 Minister of Manpower and Immigration, White Paper on Immigration (Ottawa: Queens Printer,
1966).
9 The House of Anansi was one of the interesting transactional spaces in which multiple currents of
counter-culture, Canadian nationalism, and New Left politics circulated. Anansis first employee was
American draft resister Douglas Featherling (Featherling, Travels By Night).
10 Roger Williams, The New Exiles (New York: Liveright Publishers, 1971), p. 67.
11 The Student Union for Peace Action, established in early 1964, grew out of the Combined University
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CUCND), a student peace organization heavily involved in the
anti-nuclear movement in Canada, particularly efforts against the stationing of American BOMARC
missiles in the early 1960s.
Vietnam Draft Resistance, and the Canadian State 7
guide was a young American draft resister and University of Toronto student,
Richard Paterack. As greater numbers of resisters began to arrive in the city,
counsellors sought out precise legal procedures for entering Canada and
becoming a Landed Immigrant and developed a fuller and more detailed
guide. Another draft resister and SUPA employee, Mark Satin, expanded
Escape to Freedom into a larger and more comprehensive document that
provided a wide range of information on immigration, housing, work, geog-
raphy, politics, and the weather. Satin, like Paterack, was an American who
had himself come north to avoid military service. Satin oversaw the transfor-
mation of SUPAs pamphlet into the book that was distributed across the
United States.
In just over 100 tightly packed pages The Manual provided a wealth of
information for anyone considering moving to Canada. Anticipating ques-
tions a potential draft resister might have, editor Satin methodically laid out
the pros and cons of crossing the border. He explained that draft offences and
convictions were not covered under the Canada/U.S. extradition treaty, thus
allowing draft resisters to remain in Canada legally. More than just giving
information about the mechanics of immigration and exile, Satin tried to
present a picture of what life would be like for draft resisters and what the con-
sequences of their decisions would be. Most Americans, he wrote in a frank
tone, lead the same lives in Canada they would have led in the U.S.12 He
added reassurances that draft resisters faced a sympathetic reception from
most Canadians and very little discrimination for choosing not to serve in the
U.S. military. Satin did not soft-peddle the reality of going to Canada, how-
ever. It can not be over stressed, he wrote, that draft resisters will probably
never be able to return to the U.S. without facing up to five years in jail. This
applies even to family emergencies.13
One of the most remarkable aspects of The Manual was its value as an his-
torical source. Beyond practical information about immigration, aid, and legal
advice, it provided an introduction to the complicated political and cultural
life of Canada, and particularly Toronto. The book presented the reader with
a small taste of the emergent nationalist critique of the United States, a brief
history of Canada, and guides to the literary and cultural scenes. In addition to
its primary purpose, The Manual was a means by which aid groups, expatri-
ates, and Canadian activists prefigured Toronto as cultural and political space.
Between its covers an image of Toronto emerged, one that was inclusive,
politically progressive, anti-imperialist, and counter-cultural.
The books tone was set immediately in its preface, which had two very
different introductory comments, the first by York University sociologist
William Mann and the other by Toronto Anti-Draft Program (TADP) volun-
teer and SUPA staff member Heather Dean. In his comments, Mann reiter-
12 Mark Satin, ed., The Manual for Draft-Aged Immigrants to Canada (Toronto: House of Anansi Press,
1968), p. 8.
13 Ibid., p. 9. Satin recounts how FBI agents showed up at the funeral of one draft resisters father.
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ated a number of popular stereotypes commonly referenced in differentiating
Canadians from Americans. He wrote that Canada was a slightly less
mature version of certain parts of the United States, adding that Canadians
are more inclined than Americans to conformity, to some lingering attach-
ments to Puritanism, to obeying the law and to cautious investigation of new
ideas.14 Mann concluded his comments by expressing liberal sentiments
regarding Canadas relationship to the United States. Canada, he wrote, was
facing a time of deep crisis ... trying to be independent and yet not lose the
good things that American capital and enterprise bring us.15
Manns words attempted to reassure Americans that Canada was a familiar
world, one much like the United States. In contrast, Dean placed potential
immigrants on notice that Canada was a very different place and that there
were crucial questions of power and sovereignty to be recognized. Challeng-
ing Manns assessment, Dean ended by stating that Canadians were not afraid
to lose the supposedly good things that American capital and enterprise
bring us; after all, she rhetorically noted, who needs a strip mine? The real
source of fear for Americans northern neighbour are the marines, not the
vagaries of foreign ownership. Deans comments reflected the emerging
Canadian nationalist antipathy toward the United States, stoked and fed by
the continued American military involvement in Southeast Asia.
A key strategy stressed in the manual was the need for any potential immi-
grant to maximize the number of his or her points. One of the best ways to do
this was to find employment in Canada prior to applying for Landed Immi-
grant status. Some of these jobs were real. Rick Bébout, Jearld Moldenhauer,
and John Pendergrass all followed the immigration procedure laid out in The
Manual and secured employment before officially applying for Landed sta-
tus.16 A real job was not always necessary, however; resisters Charlie Novo-
grodsky and Fred Thuery each received bogus job offers arranged for them by
draft counselling groups. Novogrodsky had his phantom employment
arranged by one of his professors at Brandeis University, Sakvan Berkovich,
a native of Montreal who had a Canadian friend write a fictitious job offer.
Theury was able to buttress his application with a phony job letter from Roch-
dale College. In any case, employment, real or fictional, meant crucial points
in the immigration application.
Getting to Canada was, of course, only the first step. Once in the country,
draft resisters needed support and assistance in getting settled. The largest
and longest-lasting aid group was the Toronto Anti-Draft Program (TADP).
Initially an offshoot of SUPAs efforts to aid draft resisters, TADP quickly
grew into an autonomous organization. From the beginning the group had a
14 William Mann, Our Identity is up for Grabs, in Satin, ed., The Manual for Draft Aged Immigrants,
p. 2.
15 Ibid., p. 3.
16 Rick Bébout, interview by author, Toronto, September 2, 1998; Jearld Moldenhauer, interview by
author, Toronto, September 3, 1998; John Pendergrass, interview by author, Toronto, May 18, 2000.
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mix of Canadian and American staff and volunteers. Veterans of the Cana-
dian anti-nuclear campaigns of the late 1950s and early 1960s, Quakers such
as Nancy Pocock, and student activists all populated the TADP offices.
Though Canadian student activists had founded TADP, it quickly attracted
Americans into its ranks. In addition to Paterack and Satin, TADP drew on
Americans who had come to Canada for a variety of personal, political, and
professional reasons. Long-time staffer Bill Spira, a leading figure in TADP
during the late 1960s and early 1970s, was himself an expatriate, having
come to Canada in 1953 because of McCarthyism. Other staff members such
as Niomi Binder Wall, who came to Toronto in 1964 from Philadelphia with
her husband at the time (a professor at the University of Toronto), played a
variety of roles within TADP. Still other Americans such as resister Bernard
Jaffe and expatriate Max Allen (who had worked in the New York resistance
group associated with writer Paul Goodmans Support in Action) were coun-
sellors, helping to settle resisters and guiding them through the process of
applying for Landed Immigrant status.17 In Jaffes view, TADP was a self-
help group and it mainly provides housing for draft dodgers coming up. It
also provides us with a sense of community.18 More than anything else,
TADP provided basic services to resisters, helping them settle into life in
Toronto and connecting them with useful contacts.
Though most draft resisters entered Canada with little or no difficulty, the
border proved to be an arbitrary and contingent site. Crossing this boundary
could be remarkably simple or it could be an exceedingly difficult and nerve-
wracking experience. In May 1968 the Toronto Star newspaper investigated a
complaint by a young man from Chicago, who claimed he had been refused
entry because he was of draftable age. Surveying five border crossings, the
newspaper discovered only one in which an official was able to cite correctly
the rules regarding immigrants from the United States.19 This was a surprising
development because the Minster of Manpower and Immigration, Jean Mar-
chand, had made it clear that draft resisters from the United States should be
allowed to enter Canada and apply for Landed Immigrant status at point of
entry, regardless of an individuals draft status.20
17 After reading Clausens article Boys without a Country in the New York Times Magazine, Allen
drove to Toronto determined to find out first-hand what the situation was for resisters. After arriving
in the city, Allen determined that he could do more for draft resisters in Canada than he could in an
American aid organization. Moreover, Allen was not enthusiastic about the Resistance position advo-
cating jail terms over emigration to Canada. See Williams, The New Exiles, p. 64. On Max Allen, see
Daniel Stoffman, Maximum Max, Toronto Star Sunday Magazine, September 16, 1979, pp. 1114,
29; Marjorie Harris, Mr. Broadloom, Canadian Magazine, May 6, 1978, p. 18. Conversation with
Max Allen, August 1997.
18 Lansing R. Shepard, Draft Evaders: Jail or Self-Exile, The Christian Science Monitor, December
19, 1968, p. 14.
19 Our Border Men BAR U.S. Draft-dodgers, Toronto Star, February 3, 1968, p. 25.
20 Gerald Dirks, Canada’s Refugee Policy: Indifference or Opportunism (Montreal and Kingston:
McGill-Queens University Press, 1977), p. 238.
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Indeed, as early as September 1966 the government was carefully staking
out its position on draft resisters. In a letter published in the American under-
ground periodical Ramparts, the Deputy Minister of Manpower and Immi-
gration, Thomas Kent, stated that no provision in the Immigration Act
prohibited the entry into Canada of any individual seeking to avoid induc-
tion into the Armed Services. If such an individual were to seek to become
a Landed Immigrant and were to meet all other requirements for immigra-
tion, he would be granted entry.21 Thus, according to Kent, draft resisters
were to be regarded as any other individuals applying for immigration as long
as they met the criteria for entry. Such criteria were, by Kents own admis-
sion, remarkably vague. Immigrants applying for residency were appraised
individually on their potential ability to establish themselves in Canada. The
basic minimum was that applicants have eleven years of schooling to be eli-
gible (though this was not strictly followed). According to Kent, [T]he deci-
sion lay entirely with the unfettered judgment of the interviewing officer,
based on the applicants personality and his or her work experience.22 This
very subjective system of applicant selection would be superseded in October
1967 by the point system that gave greater priority to education, language
skills, age, existing job, and family already residing in the country, but none-
theless kept significant discretionary powers in the hands of the interviewing
officer.23
Ostensibly, the Canadian governments policy toward draft evaders was
derived from the major military engagements earlier in the twentieth cen-
tury. During the First and Second World Wars, Canadian citizens went to the
United States to escape conscription into the armed forces. During these
years the American government did nothing to return these foreign nationals
to Canada, imprison them, or constrain them in any way. Following the end
of the Second World War, a memorandum to Canadian embassies and Chiefs
of Foreign Missions from the Department of External Affairs made the
Canadian governments policy explicit.
As indicated in section 11 of the Foreign Enlistment Act there is no objection
in principle to foreign representative sending a call-up notice to a person who
is a national of that country and who is not a Canadian citizen. The Governor
in Council has not made any formal regulations on the subject pursuant to sec-
tion 11. However, the view of the Canadian government, with which foreign
representatives will naturally wish to comply, is that such call-up notices
should not give the impression that failure to obey will expose the person to
21 Tom Kent, quoted in Ramparts, September 26, 1966.
22 Tom Kent, A Public Purpose: An Experience of Liberal Opposition and Canadian Government
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1988), p. 408.
23 Ibid., p. 410. On the history of Canadas immigration policy, see Freda Hawkins, Canada and Immi-
gration: Public Policy and Public Concern (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University
Press, 1972).
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penalties on Canadian soil.  It is reasonable and even desirable that call-up
notices should warn the person that non-compliance will expose him to penal-
ties if and when he enters the territory of the foreign country. The Canadian
Government cannot, however, permit the sending of notices which imply that
disobedience will bring immediate punishment i.e. on Canadian soil.24
This policy established that foreign nationals who had been conscripted into
military service by their country of origin would not be subject to deporta-
tion or legal penalty while on Canadian soil, and it served as the basis for
American draft resisters legal entry into Canada.
Speaking in the Canadian Parliament on February 1, 1967, Prime Minister
Lester B. Pearson reaffirmed this policy:
The rules regarding the admission to Canada of U.S. citizens would apply in
the normal way in the category. The fact that these people were draft dodgers
would probably be unknown to the Immigration Officers in any case, and I am
sure my honourable friend [the Hon. Michael Starr] would not wish to do any-
thing which would interfere with maximum freedom of movement across the
border.25
Thus draft resisters were able to enter the country under a policy that came
close to dont ask, dont tell. A draft resister could enter, but he must do so
without declaring his draft status. At the same time border officials were to
limit the inquiries of draft-aged individuals to the usual standards of admis-
sion. This policy was rearticulated by Minister of Manpower Jean Mar-
chand, who stated, [T]here is no specific prohibition against the permanent
or temporary admission to Canada of persons who are subject to, or who
appear to be avoiding, compulsory military service in their homeland.26
Ultimately, this left tremendous discretionary power to the immigration
agents at the border and did not guarantee entry of a nominally qualified
individual.
Draft resisters attempting to enter Canada had to be attentive in interviews
with Canadian border officials. The policy derived from Canadas long-
standing commitment not to prosecute individuals avoiding military service
in the armed forces of another country pertained only to those individuals
already on Canadian soil. Any individual attempting to use Canada as a tem-
porary refuge from potential criminal prosecution could be refused entry,
according to the Immigration Operations Manual used by officers at the bor-
24 National Archives of Canada [hereafter NAC], Records of the Immigration Branch, RG 76, Memo-
randum from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Their Excellencies the Chiefs of Missions,
May 6, 1947.
25 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, February 1, 1967.
26 NAC, Records of the Immigration Branch, RG 76, vol. 1210 (interim box 10), File 56601, pt. 3,
Letter from Jean Marchand, Minister of Manpower, to James Larkin, March 28, 1968.
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der. If the individual gives a clear indication of using Canada as a tempo-
rary refuge, intending to return to his home country as soon as possible, will
the examining officer refuse admission.27 Negotiating the interview at the
border was thus very important to draft resisters successful entry into Can-
ada. The application for immigrant status was a demonstration of intent to
reside permanently in Canada, a determination to make ones life in Canada,
and supposedly an indication that the applicant was not just using Canada as
a way station to wait out the Vietnam War.
The ease of entry that greeted most resisters was not, as has been noted, a
universal phenomenon. Deserters from the United States military, those indi-
viduals who had already been inducted into the services, experienced a trick-
ier negotiation of the border. For Canadian officials, deserters represented a
different class of individuals, people who on first glance were not covered by
the 1947 regulations. In the years between 1966 and 1968, only a small num-
ber of deserters entered Canada. By mid-1968, however, as the number of
deserters began to climb, it became increasingly clear that the policy toward
deserters had become stricter and that they were being treated differently than
draft resisters.28 These young Americans had entered one of the U.S. military
services and in some cases had finished tours of duty in Vietnam. Unlike his
draft resister counterpart, the average deserter tended to have little if any
higher education, few job skills, and almost no family support. The editor of
the Toronto-based resister magazine AMEX, Jack Colhoun, himself a deserter,
characterized the deserter crisis as it emerged through 1967 and 1968:
Because deserters had different needs from those of draft resisters, they pre-
sented the aid groups with a new set of problems. Most deserters came to Can-
ada on short notice, often leaving the military with only pocket change and the
clothes on their back. Counseling deserters proved to be more difficult and
time-consuming, since the point system was stacked against them, prolonging
the deserters need for free housing, and contributing to a large number of
unlanded deserters unable to legally immigrate.29
Negative images of deserters in the Canadian media, as well as the perception
that draft resisters were good expatriates and thus more likely to be politi-
cally active and to assimilate into the everyday life of Canada, posed persis-
tent problems for aid groups and publications such as AMEX. Deserter
Grayson Dunster vented his frustration with popular stereotypes of resisters
and deserters even among aid groups and other expatriates. Criticizing the
27 NAC, Records of the Immigration Branch, RG 76, Memorandum from Director, Programs and Pro-
cedures Branch to Director Immigration Operations, Quebec Region, Montreal, July 12, 1968.
28 Hoffman Deserter Case, Toronto Telegram, August 22, 1968; A Rude Awakening for U.S. Desert-
ers, U.S. News and World Report, October 28, 1968.
29 Jack Colhoun, War Resisters in Exile: The Memoirs of AMEX-Canada, AMEX, vol. 6 (September
1977), p. 17.
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comments of Larry Berg, a counsellor at the expatriate community centre
known as The Hall, who had emphasized the differences between resisters
and deserters and deserters apparent inability to cope with life in Canada,
Dunster called for an end to the differentiation between the two groups.
Characterizations of the sort made by Berg only served to feed popular prej-
udices and narrow minded pigeon-holing.30
The deserter crisis revealed that the Canadian government was keen to
keep out deserters but was unsure how to do so without paying a significant
political price. In November 1967, an American named Michael Charles
made a request for immigration application in Boston. He had been told by
Arthur Haggins, an official at the Canadian consulate in Boston, that the
Canadian government would consider for immigration personnel on active
duty in the U.S. armed forces. Charles was also informed that such an appli-
cation would remain strictly confidential between the applying party and the
Canadian government.31 In effect, Charles was told that he could apply for
Landed Immigrant status notwithstanding the fact that he was an active duty
member of the American military. Moreover, he was reassured that the U.S.
military would not be informed of his application. The consultation by the
Canadian officials and Charless application letter raised a red flag within the
Immigration Division in Ottawa. Soon after, a memorandum was issued stat-
ing that the Consulate in Boston may be giving out erroneous information
[regarding deserters] and this is brought to your attention for whatever action
you may deem necessary.32
The application of Charles came at a time when there was mounting public
pressure on the Immigration Branch to make clear its position on military
deserters and their entry into Canada. Groups such as the Committee to Aid
American War Objectors, church groups, and draft resister aid organizations
began a vigorous public campaign to bring attention to the plight of military
deserters. After meeting with the Deputy Minister for Immigration and other
top Branch officials, the Committee to Aid American War Objectors issued a
brief entitled A Note on the Handling of Draft-Aged Americans Who Apply
for Entry to Canada. This brief, which Immigration Home Branch Director
J. C. Morrison circulated among the regional immigration offices, voiced
concern over the immigration officers treatment of draft-aged Americans
trying to come to Canada:
You should make a point, therefore, of making absolutely certain that all of
your officers understand clearly and unmistakably that it is absolutely contrary
30 Grayson Dunster, Down with Draft Dodger Chauvinism, AMEX, vol. 1 (June 30, 1971), pp. 56.
31 NAC, Records of the Immigration Branch, RG 76, vol. 1210, File 56601, pt. 3, Letter to the Cana-
dian Consulate Generals Office Immigration Division Chicago Illinois From Michael Charles,
November 11, 1967.
32 NAC, Records of the Immigration Branch, RG 76, vol. 1210, File 56001, Memorandum from
Director of Foreign Branch for Regional Director A, December 27, 1967.
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to departmental policy to take draft status into account in examining a U.S. cit-
izen or permanent resident wishing to enter Canada as an immigrant or a visi-
tor. The practical position is that no examining officer should even ask a
question about draft status. If the issue crops up incidentally or is raised by the
prospective immigrant or visitor, the examining officer should state explicitly
that the matter is not relevant. I suggest, moreover, that your examining offic-
ers would probably find it useful to keep a personal record of instances in
which the draft issue does crop up during an examination, so that they will
have readily available the details of what actually happened, should any subse-
quent question be raised.33
By sending this brief to regional officers, Morrison was able to make two
important points. First, immigration officials should not inquire into the draft
status of potential immigrants or at least should not take it into consideration
when processing an application. Secondly, the behaviour of immigration
officers themselves was receiving greater public scrutiny, and officials should
be aware of this and act accordingly. Morrisons reminder to immigration
officers did not, however, make the policy regarding draft-aged immigrants
any clearer, nor did it answer the sticky question raised by Michael Charless
application request regarding the status of military deserters.34
In April 1968 an American couple by the name of Hoffman applied for
permanent residency in Canada at Landsdowne, Ontario. Because Mrs. Hoff-
man had recently been hospitalized for a pre-existing medical condition, the
immigration officers moved the couple to Fort Erie, Ontario, where she was
to be examined by an Immigration Branch doctor. In the meantime, however,
border officials had been in contact with the FBI, which informed them that
Mr. Hoffman was a deserter from the U.S. Army.35 According to the Toronto
Telegram newspaper, border officials colluded with the FBI to have Hoffman
returned to the United States. The Assistant Deputy Minister denied the
newspapers charges while reaffirming that it was government policy to
refuse admission to persons regardless of their citizenship or country of res-
idence who are under legal, contractual or moral obligation in their own
country including persons who are serving on an active basis in the armed
33 NAC, Records of the Immigration Branch, RG 76, vol. 1210, File 56601, Memorandum from J. C.
Morrison, Director Home Branch Department of Immigration to Regional Directors of Immigration
Winnipeg, Montreal, Halifax, November 27, 1967.
34 NAC, Records of the Immigration Branch, RG 76, vol. 1210, File 56601, Memorandum from
Director of Foreign Branch for Regional Director A, December 27, 1967.
35 NAC, Records of the Immigration Branch, RG 76, vol. 1210, File 56001, pt. 4, Report to the Dep-
uty Minister From the Assistant Deputy Minister (Immigration), September 5, 1968. When Mr. and
Mrs. Hoffman were deported to the United States, he was turned over to the FBI, which returned him
to the Army Military Police. After being placed in the stockade, Mr. Hoffman escaped, and the Cana-
dian government believed he had re-entered Canada illegally.
36 NAC, Records of the Immigration Branch, RG 76, vol. 1210, File 56001, pt. 4, Report to the Dep-
uty Minister From the Assistant Deputy Minister (Immigration), September 5, 1968.
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forces of their country.36 The Hoffman case created problems for the gov-
ernment and the Immigration Branch in that many deserters were able to
enter the country as visitors and then apply for Landed Immigrant status from
within Canadian borders. This situation, and the difficulty of deporting indi-
viduals who had entered the country legally and later expressed their wish to
immigrate, only added to the vagueness of the governments policy.
In early January 1968 Morrison wrote a Personal and Confidential letter
to L. R. Vachon, the Regional Director of Immigration in Montreal, which
explicitly laid out the governments position. The departments view is, as
firmly as ever, wrote Morrison, that we do not want deserters as immi-
grants.37 According to Operation Memorandum Number 117, provided to
immigration officers at the border, permanent admission to Canada is not to
be granted to military deserters. Laying out the reasons for the policy, Mor-
rison stated that most [deserters] are unacceptable for reasons other than the
fact of desertion:
Experience indicates that many deserters practice misrepresentation to gain
entry to Canada in the first place, that frequently the deserter is a man with
lower than average education and training and lacking any particular occupa-
tional qualification, and that their obviously poor motivation results in a low
rating for personal suitability. Consequently, this type of application often will
not qualify, quite apart from any exercise of discretion at the local level.38
Yet he noted that this policy may have no legal basis on which to order the
deportation of an applicant in Canada for the sole reason that he is a deserter.
Thus the policy on deserters had to remain de facto, to be administered at the
point of entry by immigration officers. Those deserters able to meet the stan-
dards to qualify for Landed Immigrant status thus posed a sticky problem for
border officials. Morrison recommended that no decision be made locally in
such cases, which should instead be sent to headquarters for final review and
disposition.
One case in the Immigration Branch files reveals the degree to which immi-
gration officials sought to keep out deserters. In this instance, an unidentified
deserter from Vancouver, Washington, attempted to enter Canada at the bor-
der near Blaine, Washington, and apply for Landed Immigrant status. The
immigration officer informed the would-be immigrant (here given the pseud-
onym John) that he had enough points to gain entry but would not be able to
enter Canada at this time because he was absent without leave from the U.S.
military. A pre-examination letter would be sent to Johns American address,
and it would need to be completed before any final decision on his application
37 NAC, Records of the Immigration Branch, RG 76, vol. 1209, File 56651, pt. 5, Letter from Mr. J.
C. Morrison to Mr. L. R. Vachon, January 9, 1968.
38 Ibid.
16 Histoire sociale / Social History
could be determined. John returned to the United States and wrote to the
Immigration Branch appealing his case and testifying to his good character.39
The governments reply to Johns inquiry about his Landed status read as fol-
lows: When you have received an honourable discharge from the Armed
Forces of the United States please send a copy of your discharge certificate to
this office. Further consideration will be given at that time.40 Such incidents
demonstrated the discretionary and often arbitrary power of immigration offi-
cials to restrict entry. Moreover, Johns case illustrated that, despite state-
ments to the contrary, some immigration officials were using military status as
a category in their assessment of potential Landed Immigrants.
The problem facing the Immigration Branch and by extension the Canadian
government was twofold. First, there did not appear to be any statutory basis
for denying military deserters access into Canada, as no legislation explicitly
stated the exclusion of such persons. Secondly, passing legislation that would
have provided such a legal basis for exclusion would have been a politically
unpopular move for the minority Liberal government. Despite this lack of
legal foundation, the policy of the Immigration Branch, prior to January 1968,
had been the exclusion of individuals serving in the armed forces of another
country from entry as immigrants. According to instructions issued by the
Ministry, people already serving in their countries armed forces were eli-
gible to apply and be processed as long as the individual is to be discharged
in the reasonably near future. No visa was to be issued or granted, however,
until he has submitted proof of his discharge.41 New immigration regula-
tions, brought into effect as of October 1, 1967, and issued as instructions to
immigration officers as of January 1968, did not, however, include specific
references to individuals serving in the armed forces of another country. As
mentioned earlier, entering as a visitor, then applying for Landed status,
became a strategy advocated by draft counselling groups such as TADP,
which were seeking ways to aid this group of refugees.
According to TADPs Bill Spira, a deserter would enter Canada as a tem-
porary visitor and then immediately apply for Landed status at an immigration
office. This strategy would prevent the possibility of individual deserters
being refused entry and of Canadian officials notifying the FBI or the military
police that a deserter was being sent back to the United States.42 The practice
raised potentially embarrassing political questions of fairness for the Immi-
gration Branch. Why should deserters who entered Canada under false pre-
39 NAC, Records of the Immigration Branch, RG 76, vol. 1209, File 56551, pt. 4, Letter to Central
Processing from unidentified deserter, Vancouver Washington, December 5, 1968.
40 NAC, Records of the Immigration Branch, RG 76, vol. 1209, File 56551, pt. 4, Letter to Unidenti-
fied Deserter Vancouver, Washington from Officer in Charge, Central Processing, December 17,
1968.
41 NAC, Records of the Immigration Branch, RG 76, vol. 1209, File 565511, pt. 4, Memorandum to
the Cabinet on the Admission to Canada of Draft Dodgers and Military Deserters, March 12, 1969.
42 Border Aid Sealed to Deserter, Globe and Mail, May 3, 1969, p. 5.
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tenses as visitors be able to stay in the country, while those requesting
admittance through proper channels at the border and other ports of entry
were refused?43
Confusion regarding the official policy on draft resisters and military
deserters was ubiquitous; politicians, civil servants, and draft counsellors all
seemed to have their own interpretations of the situation. Within the govern-
ment  from Cabinet to the top civil servants and down to career officers 
the policy remained vaguely defined and arbitrary. On February 8, 1969, five
students at Torontos Glendon College decided to test the policy on deserters
by applying for Landed Immigrant status at five different border crossings,
each using the name of an American deserter named William John Heintzel-
man. Border officials prevented two of the students, Christopher Wilson and
Graham Muir, from even completing their application forms before refusing
them entry. The actions of the border officials created a storm of controversy
because the Immigration Branchs own protocol had been breached. That pro-
tocol stipulated that all individuals be allowed to complete the entire applica-
tion process, both the written form and the interview, before a determination
on entry was to be made. By refusing to allow the students to finish the appli-
cation, the officials appeared to violate due process. Once again the spectre of
arbitrary enforcement and the potential of American interference became an
issue. This prospect of collusion between Canadian and American authorities
was reinforced by the fact that two of the students refused entry were met on
the American side by U.S. officials expecting to talk to Mr. Heintzelman.
The students considered this evidence of collusion between Canadian offi-
cials and U.S. authorities, who were expecting the return of a deserter.
The Heintzelman incident generated a flurry of discussion among top Cana-
dian politicians and civil servants. In justifying the refusal to admit the Glen-
don students, the Minister of Manpower and Immigration Allan MacEachen
described the actions of the immigration officials as entirely proper and in
accordance with the regulations.44 MacEachen based his assessment on the
discretionary power stipulations of the immigration regulations. What had
not been generally known was that individual immigration officers had this
sort of power. The supposed objectivity of the point system was thus called
into question. A Memorandum to the Cabinet, written by Allan MacEachen,
acknowledged that there had been heavy criticism of the Government and of
immigration officers with respect to the admission of draft dodgers and mili-
43 According to the Memorandum to Cabinet, deserters could be more easily refused entry at the border
because of the discretionary power given to immigration officers in the field. These officers could
refuse an application for permanent admission even though the applicant may not be specifically pro-
hibited by the Immigration Act and may in fact gain the score required by the selection standards or
norms set out in those Regulations. Apparently this discretionary power did not apply with
respect to applicants already in Canada. See NAC, Records of the Immigration Branch, RG 76, vol.
1209, File 565511, pt. 4, Memorandum to the Cabinet on the Admission to Canada of Draft Dodg-
ers and Military Deserters, March 12, 1969.
44 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, February 17, 1969.
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tary deserters. MacEachen informed his colleagues that the criticism arises
from the publics failure to appreciate the differences between a draft dodger
and a military deserter as well as the admittedly ambivalent nature of the
present policy and particularly to the discretionary authority of immigration
officers to accept or reject deserters.45
At a Cabinet committee meeting on April 1, 1969, former Manpower Min-
ister Jean Marchand expressed frustration over the apparent inconsistency in
the governments position. As minister, Marchand had attempted to have the
Immigration Branch make no distinctions between deserters and draft resist-
ers. Marchands recollection of his policy was supported by John Munro, the
former Parliamentary Secretary for Manpower, who believed that the minis-
ters statements on the entry of draft-aged Americans applied to both resisters
and deserters. MacEachen, however, challenged this interpretation and argued
that all previous Ministry statements had pertained only to draft resisters and
not to deserters.46 The meeting revealed a deep disagreement at the upper lev-
els of the Canadian government on whether deserters should be admitted and,
if so, how they should gain entry to the country. The Cabinet committee ulti-
mately concluded that the matter was a thorny one politically to touch and
sought to put any decisions off for at least a few more months.47
The Heintzelman affair added to the mounting pressure on the Canadian
government to allow deserters entry, or at least to clarify the official position
regarding them. One of the most prominent and vocal critics of the treatment
of deserters was offered by the Moderator of the United Church of Canada,
Dr. Robert McClure, who issued a statement on April 30, 1969, charging that
there existed two sets of guidelines used by immigration officers to determine
the entry of individuals. The first was set forth in the Immigration Act itself,
but the second was a set of secret guidelines given to officers stipulating
that deserters should be refused entry. Calling the policy of the government
an immoral and intolerable evasion of public responsibility, McClure chal-
lenged Allan MacEachen to reveal all guidelines regarding admission of
deserters to Canada (which MacEachen refused to do). A group of prominent
45 NAC, Records of the Immigration Branch, RG 76, vol. 1209, File 56551, pt. 4, Memorandum to
the Cabinet From Allan J. MacEachen, Minster of Manpower and Immigration, March 12, 1969.
46 NAC, Records of the Immigration Branch, RG 76, Memorandum to L. E. Couillard, Deputy Minis-
ter of Manpower from W.R. Dymon, Assistant Deputy Minister (Program Development), April 15,
1969.
47 NAC, Records of the Immigration Branch, RG 76, vol. 1209, File 56551, pt. 4, Memorandum on
Submission on Deserters at the Cabinet Committee Meeting April 1, 1969 from Assistant Deputy
Minister (Immigration) to Deputy Minister of Manpower, April 15, 1969. According to the summary
of the meeting, a division emerged within the Cabinet committee between the former Minister of
Manpower Jean Marchand, who argued that military deserters in general should face no restric-
tions, and Allan MacEachen, the current minister. Bryce Mackasey, another minister in the Trudeau
government, argued that American deserters were breaking laws democratically arrived at in their
own country and they should not be given the protection of the Canadian government as a result of
their desertion.
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journalists, writers, and politicians calling themselves the Committee for Fair
Immigration Policy asked for immigration officers to ignore military status
in another country as a legal, moral or contractual factor  directly or indi-
rectly  in determining an applicants eligibility for Immigration to Can-
ada.48 It had been on this basis of the legal, moral and contractual grounds
that the government and immigration officers rationalized the refusal to
admit deserters to Canada. In the case of a deserter, stated MacEachen,
there is certainly a legal obligation and the examining officer can take this
into account in exercising his discretion as [to] the admissibility of the appli-
cant.49 The rising pressure and the disagreement among members of the
Cabinet on how to proceed motivated the government to review its stance on
deserters.
In May 1969 the Canadian government finally relented and allowed
deserters to enter Canada as any other potential immigrant.50 The new policy
was outlined in a memorandum issued to all the regional offices of the Immi-
gration Service: The Government has decided as a matter of policy that lia-
bility for service in the armed forces of another country, including desertion
therefore, will not be taken into account in assessing a persons admissibility
to Canada as an Immigrant.51 Moreover, immigration officers were not to
inquire into the military status of an individual applicant. Should an officer
become aware of an applicants status, the officer was to treat such infor-
mation as irrelevant. The fact that the government did not need to amend
the Immigration Act to effect the change in policy underscores the point
made by Robert McClure and others, that the exclusion of deserters had not
been based on statutory grounds but rather on the discretion of the govern-
ment and individual border officials.
By eventually allowing deserters to enter Canada, the Canadian govern-
ment went against the common practices of its military allies. The procedure
of most North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member countries was
to take into custody any military deserters from other member countries and
return them to the relevant authorities in their homeland.52 By taking in
deserters, by allowing them entry and even the right to immigrate, Canadian
48 NAC, Records of the Immigration Branch, RG 76, Press Release Committee for Fair Immigration
Policy. Members of the committee included William Spira of TADP, economist Mel Watkins, urban
theorist Jane Jacobs, Toronto alderman William Kilbourn, writers Farley Mowat and June Callwood,
journalists Barbara Frum, Patrick Watson, and Robert Fulford, candidate for the mayor of Toronto
Stephen Clarkson, and the former president of the Conservative Party of Canada, Dalton Camp.
49 Canadian Press Service, MacEachen Charges Moderator Was Irresponsible, Globe and Mail, May
1, 1969, p. 4.
50 NAC, Records of the Immigration Branch, RG 76, vol. 1209, File 56551, pt. 4, Record of Cabinet
Decision, Office of the Privy Council, D. J. Leach, Supervisor of Cabinet Documents, May 15, 1969.
51 NAC, Records of the Immigration Branch, RG 76, vol. 1209, File 56551, pt. 4, Memorandum to
All Regional Directors from Director General Operations, May 20, 1969.
52 NAC, Records of the Immigration Branch, RG 76, vol. 1209, File 56551, pt. 4, Confidential Brief
on Draft Dodgers and Military Deserters, March 18, 1968.
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officials staked out a singular position among Americas Cold War allies.
Most NATO countries, in fact, did not issue passports to young men until
they had completed their compulsory military service.53 Even Sweden, the
only other Western country to take in draft resisters and deserters, gave
Americans asylum but did not allow them to enter as immigrants.
For observers such as AMEX editor Jack Colhoun, the change in policy
regarding deserters was a direct result of perceived threats to Canadian sov-
ereignty. The exposure of cooperation between Canada and the U.S. officials
 the tipping-off of American authorities during the Heintzelman incident
 raised sensitive questions of Canadian political autonomy.54 Writer Renée
Kasinsky concurs with Colhouns assessment that the rising tide of Canadian
nationalism helped to motivate the change. Kasinsky quotes Nancy Pocock, a
TADP volunteer and Canadian Friends Services Committee member, who
also saw the change in policy in terms of an upsurge of Canadian national-
ism. Most people felt if we wanted to take a deserter from another country,
Pocock asserted, it was none of the other countrys business to tell us
whether we could take them or not.55 Writer Jack Ludwig echoed Pococks
sentiments, during the height of the deserter affair, in the pages of the Globe
and Mail. According to Ludwig, the term deserter was an American label,
one that might have relevance in the United States but not one that Canadians
should accept.
The United States, of course, is free to label anyone who leaves its armed ser-
vices as a deserter, but when such a person presents himself at a Canadian
immigration entry point the U.S. definition ceases to apply. If it does not, Can-
ada has cavalierly  and I insist, quite unnecessarily  ceded part of its sig-
nificant function as a sovereign nation to a foreign power.56
These labels, in Ludwigs view, no longer carried any meaning once an indi-
vidual applied for admission to Canada. Though Canada did stake out an inde-
pendent stance, it did so to avoid domestic perceptions that it lacked
independence. Ultimately, the unpopularity of the Vietnam War gave Cana-
dian officials political shelter, allowing them to stand up to the United
States.
Taking in deserters, much as taking in draft resisters, allowed the Canadian
government to show that it was not subject to American hegemony, that Can-
53 NAC, Records of the Immigration Branch, RG 76, vol. 1209, File 56551, Memorandum to Minister
of Manpower and Immigration from Deputy Minister, May 20, 1969. An inquiry into the French
governments attitude toward deserters revealed a strict policy toward military service: The French
government is hostile to emigration of people doing their military [service] or [who] are due to do
so. NAC, Records of the Immigration Branch, RG 76, vol. 1209, File 56551, pt. 4, Memorandum
to Home Branch Ottawa, from Immigration Branch Paris, May 14, 1969.
54 Colhoun, War Resisters in Exile, p. 17.
55 Kasinsky, Refugees from Militarism, p. 125.
56 Jack Ludwig, Why We Should Not Desert Sovereignty, Globe and Mail, May 9, 1969, p. 7.
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ada was an entirely autonomous and sovereign nation. Yet the ties between
Americans and Canadians, especially in matters of security, were close,
strengthened by geography, economics, and a shared commitment to Cold
War containment. Though deserters were able to enter Canada and individu-
als were able to become Canadian citizens, the Canadian government contin-
ued to participate with U.S. law enforcement in its prosecution of the the
war at home.
The issue of deserters was settled in May 1969, but the Canadian govern-
ment nonetheless kept careful watch on draft-aged Americans entering Can-
ada. From the arrival of the first draft resisters, the RCMP had, at the behest
of the FBI, sought out and interviewed individuals who were in violation of
the U.S. Selective Service law. Resister Douglas Featherling recalls finding
the business card of an RCMP constable at his place of work along with a
note requesting that Feathering contact the officer immediately. The officer
informed Featherling that the FBI had been enquiring about my where-
abouts and happenings and asked what my intentions were.57 All this sud-
den interest in Featherling by Canadian law enforcement had been triggered
by his indictment in Pennsylvania as a draft fugitive. Though Canada may
have accepted draft resisters, the state also routinely monitored their move-
ments and passed information to the FBI and the U.S. government.
This sharing of knowledge was part of the long Cold War history of coop-
eration between the American and Canadian security states. According to
historian Steven Hewitt, there existed an affinity between Canadian and
U.S. intelligence agencies that stretched back at least to the 1930s.58 Simi-
larly, Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse have shown that the FBI and the
RCMP had been developing their own transborder ties as far back as the
Depression era. By the mid-1950s the exchange of information between these
state security agencies was such that U.S. government officials had more or
less unimpeded access to the RCMPs dossiers on subversive Canadians.59
Such contacts and interconnections meant that Canadian security services
gathered and shared intelligence, especially on Americans who visited or
resided in Canada. By the end of the Second World War, cooperation between
the two countries had resulted in the establishment of dedicated liaison offic-
ers to handle intelligence.60 This close relationship was only enhanced and
solidified by the emergence of the Cold War and the increased domestic con-
57 Featherling, Travels By Night, p. 154.
58 Steven Hewitt, Spying 101: The RCMP’s Secret Activities at Canadian Universities, 1917–1997 (Tor-
onto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), pp. 151161.
59 Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State,
1945–1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 223224.
60 Len Scher, The Un-Canadians: True Stories of the Blacklist Era (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2002), pp. 238239; Larry Hannat, The Infernal Machine: Investigating the Loyalty of Can-
ada’s Citizens (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), p. 78; J. L. Granatstein and David
Stafford, Spy Wars: Espionage and Canada from Gouzenko to Glasnost (Toronto: Key Porter Books,
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cerns generated by student and protest movements in the 1960s. Surveillance
of draft resisters and deserters fit into the post-war paradigm of security
threats that gripped both the United States and Canada during the Cold War
decades. Labour unions, students, homosexuals, and immigrants were all sus-
pect populations on which the FBI and the RCMP kept extensive tabs. 
In April 1966 the enormously popular CBC television programme This
Hour Has Seven Days profiled the case of Glenn Bristow, a citizen of the
United Kingdom who was a resident in the United States but whose parents
had settled in Canada. Bristow had been drafted by the U.S. Selective Ser-
vice but failed to report for induction at his draft board. As a result, an FBI
agent visited his mother at her Vancouver home informing her that her son
was a draft dodger. What troubled the reporters on This Hour was that the
FBI agent, Alfie Gunn, was operating in Canada without the knowledge or
accompaniment of any Canadian authorities.61 Such a situation seemed a
clear breach of national sovereignty.
An editorial in Canadas pre-eminent news magazine, Maclean’s, ques-
tioned the RCMPs rationale for interviewing draft resisters, as these individ-
uals had violated no Canadian laws. Moreover, the law that they had broken
in the United States is not deemed in any country to create an extractable
offense. Though cooperation between the RCMP and FBI in criminal mat-
ters was desirable and even necessary, the editorial opined, it was not
warranted in the case of resisters and deserters, and the RCMP should cease
its efforts.62 Of course, the Canadian security state did not take its cues from
the media and continued to gather information on draft resisters and deserters
for the FBI. In response to a question in Parliament, Canadas Solicitor Gen-
eral G. J. McGrath revealed that the RCMP had interviewed 2,259 resisters
and deserters regarding their status in Canada.63
The RCMPs interest in deserters and other suspect Americans was based
on a history of cooperation and shared purpose between the United States and
Canada regarding security matters.64 With special relationships in many
fields and an open frontier with the United States, declared the Royal Com-
mission on Security, Canada has a serious responsibility to ensure that its
territory is not used as a base for the mounting and direction of foreign espi-
onage and subversive operations against the United States.65 Throughout the
Cold War Canadas security service had become closely tied to American
61 NAC, VI 83020104, CBC Television, This Hour Has Seven Days, April 18, 1966.
62 Editorial, Dear RCMP: Draft-dodgers are Refugees, not Criminals, Maclean’s Magazine, Septem-
ber 17, 1966, p. 3.
63 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, November 10, 1969.
64 Hewitt, Spying 101, pp. 159161; Lorne Brown and Caroline Brown, An Unauthorized History of the
RCMP (Toronto: James Lewis and Samuel, 1973), p. xx.
65 Report of the Royal Commission on Security Abridged (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1969), p. 1, as cited
in Brown and Brown, An Unauthorized History, p. 109.
66 Gary Kinsman, Dieter K. Buse, and Mercedes Steedman, eds., Whose National Security: Canadian
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Vietnam Draft Resistance, and the Canadian State 23
efforts against suspected communists and undesirables.66 The effects of the
American war at home put pressure on the RCMP to continue to match its
internal security concerns with those of the FBI, even aiding the FBI in pur-
suit of these perceived threats. As scholar Martha Huggins has argued, the
reciprocal assistance provided by the United States to foreign security forces
has served to make foreign police into a political extension and servant of
U.S. military and C.I.A. internal security concerns.67
According to an article published in the Globe and Mail, the FBI was main-
taining a computer database of deserters living outside the United States. This
information would enable law enforcement officials in the United States and
Canada to monitor the whereabouts of deserters.68 In particular, these files
would allow the notification of authorities and apprehension of deserters
should they attempt to re-enter the United States. Apparently, the RCMP
would, on the request of the FBI, pursue the matter [of an individual deserter]
to the extent of asking if he intends to return to the United States.69 The prac-
tice of gathering information on resisters and deserters continued even after
the Canadian government changed its policy. In March 1975 the release of
U.S. embassy documents revealed that the RCMP had continued to collect
information on draft resisters and deserters throughout the early 1970s, pass-
ing this surveillance material along to U.S. authorities. These embassy docu-
ments showed that U.S. authorities were able to track the employment and
immigration status of individual deserters.70
In addition to the U.S. embassy documents, internal memoranda from the
Ministry of Manpower and Immigration point to a procedure regarding the
collection and exchange of materials among the FBI, the RCMP, and the
Ministry.71 As Canadian lawyer Paul Copeland pointed out, the RCMP gath-
ered all this material, at the expense of Canadian taxpayers, for the benefit of
the U.S. government.72 In so doing, the Canadian government acted as secu-
rity agent in the monitoring of American citizens abroad. Yet, as historians
Steven Hewitt, Reg Whitaker, and Greg Kealey have shown, the Canadian
security state was deeply concerned over the possible destabilizing and dis-
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ruptive influence of left-wing, not to mention foreign, elements.73
A number of incidents point to the effects of this extensive security rela-
tionship in which the RCMP, acting at the behest of the FBI, endeavoured to
harass American expatriates and, in some cases, prevent their entry into Can-
ada. In addition to the Hoffman case mentioned earlier, another group of
deserters was detained by the RCMP, deported to the United States, and
directly turned over to the United States Navy.74 After being in Canada legally
for ten days, the deserters had made the mistake of asking an RCMP officer
what the law was on hitchhiking. The officer, learning they were deserters,
decided to escort the three young men directly to the border where a Canadian
immigration officer turned them over to U.S. military officials. Though this
was clearly against the Canadian governments May 1969 policy on deserters,
it reflected the continued hostility of the Canadian state toward their pres-
ence.75 The case of the three deserters was reminiscent of another mysterious
deportation, that of deserter Dennis Seaman in April 1969. The RCMP
rousted Seaman, who was staying at a Vancouver hostel, from his sleep and
took him into custody. The RCMP then turned Seaman over to Immigration
Branch officials, who promptly deported him. Once again, no arrest had been
made, no deportation procedure was followed, and no explanation was
offered regarding the basis for Seamans expulsion from Canada.76
The speedy way in which the RCMP was able to deport individuals may
have been a strategy to prevent deserters from receiving support and legal
counsel. When deserters were able to get assistance from draft counsellors or
lawyers, the results tended to be quite different. In Toronto two lawyers in par-
ticular, Clayton Ruby (a former SUPA staff member) and Paul Copeland, han-
dled many cases involving deserters. According to Copeland, those deserters
who are serious about staying have no problems. But there are many cases
involving deserters who are in trouble in the States and find themselves in
trouble up here.77 One case in which Ruby and Copeland were able to pre-
vent a deserters return to the United States involved Jerry Mihm, who had
worked illegally without obtaining Landed Immigrant status. After a failed
appeal to the Supreme Court, Mihm travelled to Jamaica to avoid being turned
over to the U.S. authorities.78 Eventually, the two lawyers were able to get
Mihms case examined by the Minister of Manpower and Immigration, who
allowed him to return to Canada as a Landed Immigrant.
Another case handled by Paul Copeland further suggests that Canadian
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immigration was being influenced by the agenda of the American govern-
ment. In the spring of 1970, Torontos York University hired American histo-
rian Gabriel Kolko as a member of its Social Sciences Faculty. Kolko went
through the normal procedure of applying for Landed Immigrant status and
fully expected to take up his position in the fall. Getting Landed status should
not have been a problem for Kolko, as his educational level, professional
background, job offer, and fluency in English easily added up to enough
points. It came as a surprise, therefore, when the Department of Manpower
and Immigration sent him a letter denying him Landed status on the basis
that his presence here would be contrary to Canadas national interest.79
Copeland challenged the decision and threatened to file a writ of mandamus
against the government. Copelands involvement got the immigration offi-
cials to reverse their earlier ruling, and they granted Kolko Landed Immigrant
status, thus enabling him to enter the country and begin teaching.80 The Immi-
gration Branchs treatment of Kolko was not isolated. Throughout the 1960s
and early 1970s, foreign academics associated with the left had a great deal of
difficulty gaining entry into Canada, despite the supposedly objective stan-
dards of the point system.81
The entry of controversial Americans into Canada raised important ques-
tions about the relationship of American power to the maintenance of Cana-
dian sovereignty. Writing in AMEX, Charles Campbell decried what he saw as
a double standard on the part of the Canadian government. According to
Campbell, Canadian officials were motivated in their actions by a common-
ality of interests with the U.S. ruling class. Draft resisters and dodgers served
a role, both as badges of tolerance ... as well as badges of independence for
Canadians. But this was merely a symbolic distinction, in Campbells view.
Cooperation between the RCMP and the FBI was a vivid illustration that Can-
ada was in lock-step with U.S. government policy.82 Campbells analysis of
the situation was correct on a number of counts. In effect the Canadian gov-
ernment had it both ways. It wanted to allow draft-aged immigrants entry to
illustrate Canadas independence from the United States, to show that the
country was not beholden to U.S. power. Yet, as Campbell asserts, the Immi-
gration Branch did at times act in concert with the United States by refusing
entry to those individuals the Branch deemed undesirable. Clearly, tolerance
and independence had their limitations.
In coming to Canada, American expatriates thought that they could leave
the United States behind, literally escaping American state power. For those
under the threat of imprisonment, the journey north was successful  it
79 U.S. Prof Can Stay Here, AMEX, vol. 1 (October/November 1970), p. 24.
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allowed them to stay out of jail  but it also had a cost. Leaving the United
States meant leaving behind family and friends without any hope or possibil-
ity of being able to return. If Canada was open to resisters and deserters,
America was closed. Yet leaving America did not mean leaving it completely
behind.
Ultimately the ease with which so many expatriate Americans entered
Canada reflected Canadian post-war ambitions to modernize and develop, to
become more technologically advanced, and to upgrade the skills of the
work force. Young, educated, and skilled Americans fit perfectly into these
goals. In addition, the presence of these Americans served an important sym-
bolic role for the Canadian government. By taking in draft resisters, Cana-
dian officials could point to their independence from the United States. By
not deporting resisters, the Pearson Liberals could demonstrate a measure of
autonomy, something that had been called into question by Canadas accep-
tance of the BOMARC missiles. This independence was tightly proscribed,
however, as the debate around deserters illustrated. The Canadian govern-
ment would be independent as long as it served government interests, but
once those interests ceased to apply, or when individuals were thought to be
a possible security threat, the attitude of acceptance changed. Only when the
deserter issue came to be framed as a question of national sovereignty did
the government officially change its entry policy. Throughout it all, expatri-
ate Americans were a monitored population, a reflection of Canadas partici-
pation and support of American Cold War hegemony.
Embedded throughout the entire issue of immigration and entry was the
discourse of national belonging and cultural distinction. Since the Revolu-
tionary War, Americans had been migrating north, but, in the wake of the
war in Vietnam and the social and political fermentation of the 1960s, their
presence had become an increasingly vexing issue. With the emergence of a
vigorous English Canadian nationalism in the mid-1960s, the appearance of
American expatriates took on an even greater political significance, one that
touched on issues of U.S. imperialism, cultural domination, and Canadas
economic dependency. In these debates American expatriates would be at
the centre of a political storm concerning the relations between the two
countries. Both as actors and as symbolic figures, expatriates were embodied
sites for the ongoing transaction of U.S. imperialism and English Canadian
nationalism.
